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Abstract 
The enjoyment of some rights by third-country nationals in the EU is not dependent on the primary 
beneficiary of rights (be it a person or a company), thereby connecting the third-country nationals with 
the law of the Union directly, without any proxy Moreover, in essence some of such rights are 
remarkably similar to the rights that EU citizens enjoy. Such directly enjoyable quasi-EU citizenship 
rights and their holders – many a category of third country nationals – constitute the key focus of this 
contribution, which aspires to walk through all the main statuses of third country nationals in the EU 
enjoying direct – as opposed to derivative – quasi-citizenship rights in the Union. Concluding such 
overview three significant interrelated problems with the way how third country nationals are treated 
in the EU are outlined: 
 EU migration regulation assumes the denial of the legal political reality of the Union; 1.
 EU migration regulation bars rationality from being taken into account when third country 2.
nationals’ rights are at stake; 
 EU migration regulation sends a problematic signal that the goals and principles of the Union 3.
can be consistently ignored. 
We argue that such treatment of the legal-political reality of the European integration project is most 
unhelpful and has to be changed. 
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Introduction 
The European citizenship rights, which, alongside the rising importance of the status of EU 
citizenship
1
 as such came to play a vital role in the context of European constitutional architecture,
2
 
are not necessarily marked by exclusivity.
3
 Some such rights can be enjoyed by groups of third-
country nationals and are thus not directly connected to the idea of possession of a European 
citizenship status. From the simple enumeration of different classes of persons who are not in 
possession of European citizenship and yet able to enjoy certain rights in the EU that can be 
characterised as genuinely similar – to some extent at least – to European citizenship rights in the 
Treaties,
4
 it becomes clear that Union law as it stands provides for a number of at times overlapping 
statuses for non-citizens of the Union, forming a highly sophisticated web of entitlements and 
obligations.
5
 For instance, a Turkish national covered by the Ankara agreement
6
 can also derive rights 
stemming from EU law as partner of an European citizen exercising free movement rights
7
 and, at the 
same time, enjoy the status of a long-term resident in the territory of the Community under the 
Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents.
8
  
                                                     
1 For analyses of the notion, see, Dimitry Kochenov, ‘The Essence of EU Citizenship Emerging from the Last Ten Years of 
Academic Debate: Beyond the Cherry Blossoms and the Moon?’ (2013) 62 IntCompLQ 97; Ferdinand Wollenschläger, 
‘A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and Its Dynamics for Shifting the 
Economic Paradigm of European Integration’ (2011) 17 ELJ 34; Koen Lenaerts, ‘“Civis europaeus sum”: From the 
Cross-border Link to the Status of Citizen of the Union’ (2011) 3 Online J. Free Movement of Workers within the Eur. 
Community 6. 
2 See, Dimitry Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP 2015) (forthcoming); Dimitry 
Kochenov, ‘The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification’ (2013) 19 ELJ 502. 
3 That citizenship rights in the Treaty are not reserved uniquely to citizens has been underlined on a number of occasions. See 
e.g. Vlad Constantinesco, ‘La cittadinanza dell’Unione: Una “vera” cittadinanza?’ in Lucia S Rossi (ed.), Il progetto di 
Trattato-Costituzione: Verso una nuova architettura dell’Unione Europea (Giuffrè 2004) 223, 227, focusing on the 
analysis of the exclusivity of citizenship rights in the Treaty Establishing a Consitution for Europe (which never entered 
into force), and Roy W Davis, ‘Citizenship of the Union … Rights for All’ (2002) 27 ELRev 121, 136, focusing on the 
analysis of the exclusivity of citizenship rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
4 I.e. finding parallels with the rights listed in Part II TFEU. 
5 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘Citizenship and Obligation’ in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of European Union Law (OUP 2012) 159; Dimitry Kochenov, ‘EU Citizenship without Duties’ (2014) 20 
ELJ 482. 
6 OJ 1963 3687; OJ 1977 L361/1. See, for the evolution of the complex relationship as applied to persons, Daniel Thym, ‘The 
European Court of Justice, Law, Politics and the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement’, in this volume and Kees 
Groenendijk, ‘The Court of Justice and the Development of EEC-Turkey Association Law’, in this volume. 
7 ECJ, Singh, C-370/90, EU:C:1992:296; ECJ, Metock, C-127/08 EU:C:2008:449; ECJ, O&B, C-456/12 EU:C:2014:135. 
Steve Peers, ‘Free Movement, Immigration Control and Constitutional Conflict’ (2009) 5 EuConst 173; Alina 
Tryfonidou, ‘Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More Liberal Approach’ (2009) 15 
ELJ 634; Peter Van Elsuwege and Dimitry Kochenov, ‘On the Limits of Judicial Intervention: EU Citizenship and 
Family Reunification Rights’ (2011) 13 EJML 443.  
8 Directive 2003/109/EC (OJ 2004 L 16/44). This Directive is the first significant step towards a certain harmonization of the 
treatment of the third-country nationals in the Community not based on derivative rights or international agreements with 
the third countries. Arguably, the Directive continued the process started with the Commission’s 1985 White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market: European Commission, White Paper on Completing the Internal Market (COM(85) 310) 
para 55. For a compelling and meticulous analysis of the Directive, see Diego Acosta Arcarazo, The Long-Term 
Residence Status as a Subsidiary Form of EU Citizenship (Brill 2011); Anja Wiesbrock, Legal Migration in the 
European Union (Brill 2010). 
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Before the adoption of the Directive, the third-country nationals
9
 residing in the EU were mainly in 
possession of EU rights stemming from three sources: their connection with an EU citizen, resulting in 
a number of derivative rights;
10
 an employment relationship with a company using its right to provide 
services in the Member State other than its own, equally resulting in a number of derivative rights;
11
 
and international agreements concluded by the Union and the Member States with their countries of 
nationality.
12
 The dynamic development of secondary Union law, from the Directive 2003/109/EC on, 
has greatly extended the set of rights enjoyed by third-country nationals, creating a picture of at times 
astonishing sophistication.
13
 
                                                     
9 For the assessment of the legal position of the third-country nationals in the EU see e.g. Wiesbrock (n 8); Georgia 
Papagianni, ‘Free Movement of Third Country Nationals on the Eve of 1 May 2004: Another Missed Deadline?’ in 
Domink Hanf and Rodolphe Muñoz (eds), La libre circulation des personnes: États des lieux et perspectives (Peter Lang 
2007) 145; Martin Hedemann-Robinson, ‘An Overview of Recent Legal Developments at Community Level in Relation 
to Third-country Nationals Resident within the European Union, with Particular Reference to the Case-law of the 
European Court of Justice’ (2001) 38 CMLRev 525; Helen Staples, The Legal Status of Third-country Nationals Resident 
in the European Union (Kluwer Law International 1999); Ian Ward, ‘Law and the Other Europeans’ (1997) 35 
JCommMrktStud 79; Steve Peers, ‘Towards Equality: Actual and Potential Rights of Third-Country Nationals in the 
European Union’ (1996) 33 CMLRev 8; Andrew Evans, ‘Third-country nationals and the Treaty on European Union’ 
(1994) 5 EJIL 199; Peter Oliver, ‘Non-Community Nationals and the Treaty of Rome’ (1985) 5 YbEuL 57; Sonia 
Morano-Foadi and Stelios Andreadakis, ‘The convergence of the European legal system in the treatment of third country 
nationals in Europe’ (2011) 22 EJIL 1071; Anja Wiesbrock, ‘Granting Citizenship-related Rights to Third-Country 
Nationals: An Alternative to the Full Extension of European Union Citizenship’ (2012) 14 EuJML 63; Daniel Thym, ‘EU 
Migration Policy and its Constitutional Rationale: A Cosmopolitan Outlook’ (2013) 50 CMLRev 709; Paula García 
Andrada, ‘Privileged Third-country Nationals and Their Right to Free Movement and Residence to and in the EU: 
Questions of Status and Competence’ in Elspeth Guild, Cristina Gortázar Rotaeche, and Dora Kostakopoulou (eds), The 
Reconceptualization of European Union Citizenship (Brill 2014) 111. It has been argued that third-country national 
permanent residents of one of the Member States of the European Union should be granted European citizenship 
equalizing their Treaty status with that of the nationals of the Member States: Michael A Becker, ‘Managing Diversity in 
the European Union: Inclusive European Citizenship and Third-Country Nationals’ (2004) Yale Hum Rts and Dev 132. 
10 E.g. Art. 3 Directive 2004/38. See Cédric Chenevièvre, ‘Régime juridique des ressortissants d’Etats tiers membres de la 
famille d’un citoyen de l’Union’, in Domink Hanf and Rodolphe Muñoz (eds), La libre circulation des personnes: États 
des lieux et perspectives (Peter Lang 2007) 125; Van Elsuwege and Kochenov (n 7) Tryfonidou (n 7). 
11 ECJ, Raymond Vander Elst, C-43/93 EU:C:1994:310, para 21; ECJ, Rush Portuguesa Ldª, C-113/89, EU:C:1990:142, para 
12; ECJ, Seco SA and Desquenne and Giral, 62 and 63/81 [1982] ECR 223. 
12 Relevant agreements with a number of countries have been concluded. The most important of them are: 
 Association Agreement with Turkey (Ankara Agreement) and an additional protocol to it (OJ 1963 3687; OJ 1977 
L361/1); Customs Union with Turkey (OJ 1996 L 35); 
 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association with Algeria (OJ 2005 L 265); Egypt (OJ 2004 L 304); 
Israel (OJ 2000 L 147); Jordan (OJ 2002 L 129); Lebanon (OJ 2006 L143); Morocco (OJ 2000 L 70); Tunisia (OJ 
1998 L 97); 
 Interim Association Agreement with the Palestinian Authority (OJ 1997 L 187); 
 The EEA Agreement (OJ 1997 L1/1); 
 EC – Switzerland Agreement (OJ 2002 L114/6); 
 Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Macedonia (OJ 2004 L 84/13) Albania (OJ 2009 L 107/166) Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (OJ 2008 L 1689/13) Montenegro (OJ 2010 L 108/3) Serbia (OJ 2010 L 28/2). 
13 Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service (OJ 2004 L 375/12); Council Directive 
2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of 
scientific research (OJ 2005 L 289/15); Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly-qualified employment (OJ 2009 L 155/17); Directive 
2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a 
single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of 
rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State (OJ 2011 L 343/1); Directive 2014/36/EU of the 
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The implications of this for the third-country nationals have been truly far-reaching, as it only 
reinforced a long-observable trend in the EU, where several groups of persons not boasting EU 
citizenship status now nevertheless enjoy the rights also popularly associated with the status of 
European citizenship. Especially the ‘quasi-citizenship’ rights of third-country nationals with direct, 
not derivative rights, are of interest here, since their enjoyment is not dependent on the primary 
beneficiary of rights (be it a person or a company), thereby connecting the third-country nationals with 
the law of the Union directly, without any proxy.  
Such directly enjoyable quasi-EU citizenship rights and their holders – many a category of third 
country nationals, constitute the key focus of this contribution, which aspires to walk through all the 
main statuses of third country nationals in the EU enjoying direct – as opposed to derivative –  
quasi-citizenship rights in the Union. Five such categories are of particular interest when testing the 
boundaries of the personal scope of application of European quasi-citizenship rights.
14
 They include: 
any person, EU citizens and third-country nationals alike; a third-country national who is a short-term 
resident of the EU under a number of special secondary law instruments adopted over the recent 
years;
15
 a third-country national who is a long-term resident in terms of Directive 2003/109/EC;  
a Commonwealth citizen with no Member State nationality residing in the United Kingdom; and 
nationals of the third-countries with which the EU and the Member States concluded special 
agreements resulting in additional enforceable rights for these individuals.
16
  
Before discussing each of the groups outlined in some detail, however, this contribution starts with an 
‘aside’, first turning to the origins of the notion of a ‘foreigner’ in the context of the Internal Market,17 
by looking at the first steps in the interpretation of the personal scope of EU law by the ECJ to 
underline that the rights of third-country nationals the EU legislator has been consistently developing 
over the last decades are meant to fill a gap left open at the commencement of European integration. In 
addition to providing an overview of the directly enjoyable quasi-EU citizenship rights of third-
country nationals, this paper offers some criticism of the current system. Based on some of the 
shortcomings of the different regimes, the paper concludes by providing some meta-criticism of the 
current system, which is over-complicated, user-unfriendly and fails at the most fundamental level: it 
falls short of elaborating a truly European approach to the status and the rights of those de facto 
Europeans who cannot boast the citizenship of the Union. In this sense, while the creation of the 
Internal Market and the moulding of an ever more important status of EU citizenship has 
unquestionably changed the legal reality in Europe, touching the areas both within and outwith the 
scope of EU competences sensu stricto,
18
 the approach to third-country nationals in the EU is marked 
by overwhelming short-sightedness, resulting in a highly fragmented policies, allowing for sometimes 
arbitrary distinctions between different categories of third-country nationals and EU citizens. Any 
meaningful approach to third-country nationals in the future is bound – whether we want it or not – to 
(Contd.)                                                                  
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers (OJ 2014 L 94/375); Directive 2014/66/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the 
framework of an intra-corporate transfer (OJ 2014 L 157/1). The fragmented nature of the legislative framework has been 
criticised in the literature. Sergio Carrera and others, ‘Labour Migration Policy in the EU: A Renewed Agenda for Europe 
2020’ (2011) CEPS Policy Brief No 240. 
14 For a brilliant outline of a personal scope of EU law, see Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Seeing the Wood despite the Trees? On the 
Scope of Union Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects?’ (2008) 45 CMLRev 13. 
15 See note 13 above. 
16 This category includes several different sub-categories, since third-nationals’ rights vary depending on the particular 
agreement from which they derive their rights. 
17 For general analyses of the interconnections existing between EU citizenship and the Internal Market, see, e.g. Niamh Nic 
Shuibhne, ‘The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship’ (2010) 47 CMLRev 1597; Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Member State 
Nationalities and the Internal Market: Illusions and Reality’ in Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Laurence W Gormley (eds), 
From Single Market to Economic Union: Essays in Memory of John A. Usher (OUP 2012). 
18 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘The Citizenship Paradigm’ (2013) 15 CYbEuL 196. 
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stop pretending that the European Union is not there, overwhelmingly affecting – if not shaping – key 
policy fields. A fundamental change in mentality of approaching ‘alienness’ in the EU is thus  
urgently required. 
An Aside: Third-country Nationals and the Scope of Article 45 TFEU 
Before moving to the European quasi-citizenship rights proper, a short overview of the personal scope 
of application of the workers’ free movement rights to third country nationals should be provided.  
It can shed light on the intentions of the drafters of the Treaties regarding the granting of rights to 
third-country nationals. It is also of direct concern to the possible development of the third-country 
nationals’ quasi-citizenship rights in the years to come.  
EU citizenship, as a ius tractum (or derivative
19
) status is intimately connected with the nationalities of 
the Member States, as one cannot acquire an EU citizenship status without possessing such  
a nationality.
20
 The wording of the crucial Treaty provisions on this issue can potentially mislead, 
however. Notwithstanding that fact that Article 9 TEU states that ‘every national of a Member State 
shall be a citizen of the Union’21 the meaning of ‘nationality’ in this provision is not defined at EU 
level and is a sovereign competence of the Member States to establish.
22
 Moreover, in Kaur the ECJ 
clarified that the Member States are free to create special categories of nationals, which would not 
benefit from EU citizenship.
23
 The Court recognised the validity of the unilateral limitations implied in 
distinguishing ‘nationality’ from a ‘nationality for Community purposes’ in the Declarations appended 
by some Member States, most notably Germany and the UK to the Treaties.
24
 As a consequence, only 
‘nationals for the purposes of EU law’ became EU citizens.25 The question thus remains open, whether 
nationals for the purposes of EU law should be Member State nationals at all. The historical examples 
established by the first UK Declaration seems to be pointing to the fact that such a nationality is not 
required: non-UK nationals fell within the category of ‘nationals for the purposes of Community law’ 
based on the UK Declaration.
26
 While the whole idea of taking such Declarations seriously provoked 
scholarly criticism,
27
 this is the law.
28
  
                                                     
19 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces’ (2009) 15 ColJEuL 169. 
20 ECJ, Rottmann C-135/08, EU:C:2010:104. 
21 Art. 9 TEU. For a virtually identical wording, see also Art. 20(1) TFEU. 
22 Rottmann (n 20); ECJ, Micheletti, C-369/90, EU:C:1992:295; ECJ, Kaur, C-192/99, EU:C:2001:106. Dmitry Kochenov 
and Aleksejs Dimitrovs, ‘EU Citizenship for Latvian Non-Citizens: A Concrete Proposal’ (2013) JMWP (NYU Law 
School) No 14/13; Stephen Hall, ‘Determining the Scope ratione personae of European Citizenship: Customary 
International Law Prevails for Now’ (2001) 28 LIEI 355. 
23 Kaur (n 22)  
24 Treaty of Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, 1st U.K. Declaration (OJ 1972 L 73). It was later updated upon the entry into force of the 
1981 British Nationality Act. See, e.g., Andrew C. Evans, ‘Nationality Law and the Free Movement of Persons in the 
EEC: With Special Reference to the British Nationality Act 1981’ (1982) 2 YbEuL 173, 189; KR Simmonds, ‘The 
British Nationality Act 1981 and the Definition of the Term “National” for Community Purposes’ (1984) 21 CMLRev 
675. See also Ákos G Toth, ‘The Legal Status of the Declarations Attached to the Single European Act’ (1986) 23 
CMLRev 803 (on the legal effect of declarations in EU law). 
25 See, also, the way how the Court distinguished Kaur in Rottmann, arguing that Mrs Kaur has never held EU citizenship 
(Rottmann (n 20) para 49), while, as is absolutely clear from the materials in that case, her British Nationality has never 
been in doubt (Kaur (n 22) para 11). 
26 1st UK Declaration (n 24) point (a). 
27 Richard Plender, ‘An Incipient Form of European Citizenship’ in Francis G Jacobs (ed), European Law and the Individual 
(North Holland 1976) 39. 
28 Kaur (n 22). 
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The situation would have been different would third country national have been included within the 
personal scope of EU law. Before the formal inclusion of the European citizenship status into the text 
of the Treaties
29
 it was far from clear which categories of persons were covered by the free movement 
right for workers. This right is conferred by Article 45 TFEU on the ‘workers of the Member States’.30 
Clearly, having made no reference to the requirement to possess Member State’s nationality, the 
Treaty could be (and should have been) interpreted in such a way as to cover all the workers legally 
resident in the Union, not only those in possession of the Member State’s nationality for Union law 
purposes.
31
 The narrow reading given to the workers’ free movement provisions by the ECJ in all the 
free movement of persons cases that excluded all the workers who are third-country nationals from the 
scope of application of Article 45 TFEU is contested in the literature. Andrew Evans in particular has 
been an outspoken critic of the Court’s approach to the interpretation of the scope of Article 45 
TFEU.
32
 Indeed, to limit the application of the Article to Member State nationals, which has been done 
both in the secondary law of the Community
33
 and the case-law of the ECJ,
34
 seems ‘inconsistent with 
the goals of the common market.’35 Agreeing with Blanke and MacGregor, ‘it would seem obvious 
that a seamless functioning of the Internal Market, given its borderless character, would prescribe the 
unlimited free movement of EU citizens and legally resident non-EU nationals alike within it’.36 
Additionally, an argument can be made that the very wording of the Treaties seemed to be implying 
that the fundamental freedoms stemming from the supranational law in Europe were to flow from 
residence and the fact of one’s integration into the labour market – as Article 45 TFEU seems to 
assume, too – rather than nationality. Should nationality be of relevance for the drafters of the 
Treaties, explaining some of the provisions – and most notably Article 202 TFEU (which has been in 
the Treaties since the founding of the EEC), dealing with the possibility to regulate free movement of 
persons with the Overseas Countries and Territories of the EU (OCTs)
37
 – would be difficult. Article 
202 TFEU presumes that free movement with OCTs is to be based on a separate provision unrelated to 
Articles 45 and 21 TFEU,
38
 which is a potentially far-reaching sign of importance of residence, rather 
than nationality, as the main factor to be taken into account when construing the scope ratione 
                                                     
29 Antje Wiener, “European” Citizenship Practice – Building Institutions of a Non-State (Westview Press 1997); Matthew J 
Elsmore and Peter Starup, ‘Union Citizenship – Background, Jurisprudence, and Perspective: The Past, Present, and 
Future of Law and Policy’ (2007) 26 YbEuL 57. 
30 Art. 45(2) TFEU. 
31 This would also be in line with Art. 45(1) TFEU which covers ‘free movement of persons’ with no reference to any 
nationality requirements. The provisions of the Treaties dealing with establishment and free movement of services do not 
offer such a possibility, making express references to the possession of the nationality of the Member States: Arts. 49 
TFEU and 56 TFEU. 
32 Evans (n 9) 205. See also Elspeth Guild and Steve Peers, ‘Out of the Ghetto? The Personal Scope of EU Law’ in Steve 
Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds), EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 81. For 
a counter-argument see Thym (n 9) 718-719. 
33 Art. 1(1) of Regulation 1612/68/EEC (OJ 1968 L 257/2). 
34 E.g. ECJ, Caisse d’allocations familiales, 238/83, EU:C:1984:250, para 7. 
35 Becker (n 9) 138. 
36 Gordon Blanke and Anne MacGregor, ‘Free Movement of Persons within the EU: Current Entitlements of EU Citizens and 
Third-country Nationals – A Comparative Overview’ (2002) 8 IntTrLRev 173. See also Martin Hedemann-Robinson, 
‘Third-Country Nationals, European Union Citizenship, and Free Movement of Persons: a Time for Bridges rather than 
Divisions’ (1996) 1 YbEUL 321; Thomas Hoogenboom, ‘Integration into Society and Free Movement of Non-EC 
Nationals’ (1992) 3 EJIL 36, 39 et seq. Dimitry Kochenov (n 17). 
37 Cf. Dimitry Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas (Kluwer Law International 2011). 
38 Article 202 TFEU refers to a necessity to use the Article 203 TFEU procedure to establish free movement for OCT 
residents. 
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personae of EU law.
39
 The fact is that the OCTs are undoubtedly inhabited by Member State nationals 
(now EU citizens) is well known,
40
 just as the fact that residence outside of the Union does not 
disqualify EU citizens from a possibility to benefit from the rights established by EU law
41
 – free 
movement included. 
These observations should make clear at least that the link between benefiting from EU law and 
nationality is not – legal-historically at least – as straight-forward, as we now tend to assume. 
Consequently, on a closer scrutiny, Directive 2003/109/EC – just as the Blue Card Directive – 
granting limited free movement rights to third-country nationals seems to be an attempt of the EU 
legislator to deal with the Court’s narrow reading of the Treaties, whose record in the field of 
protection of the rights of the third-country nationals has been quite dubious at times.
42
 
Third-country Nationals and European Citizenship Rights 
Many third-country nationals within the EU are provided with directly enjoyable quasi-EU citizenship 
rights. This section distinguishes five such quasi-citizenship categories, namely: any person; third-
country nationals who are long-term residents; short-term resident third-country nationals;  
a Commonwealth citizen with no Member State nationality residing in the United Kingdom; and 
nationals of the third-countries with which the EU and the Member States concluded special 
agreements resulting in additional enforceable rights for these individuals.   
‘Any Person’ 
European Union citizenship rights are drafted in such a way that two of them can be enjoyed by ‘any 
person’, EU citizens and third-country nationals alike. Although this is not stated directly in the text of 
Article 24 TFEU, the wording of this provision contains references to Articles 227 and 228 TFEU and 
Articles 43 and 44 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, spelling out the same right in a broader 
context. Given the scope of their application, it is puzzling why the rights to petition the EP and to 
apply to the Ombudsman are actually included among the citizenship rights of the Treaty. 
Third-country Nationals Who are Long-term Residents 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long term 
residents was a response to the Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions.
43
 While this 
                                                     
39 For an analysis, see, Dimitry Kochenov, ‘The Puzzle of Citizenship and Territory in the EU: On European Rigths 
Overseas’ (2010) 17 MJ 230. 
40 Ibid. 
41 ECJ, Eman and Sevinger, C-300/04 EU:C:2006:545. 
42 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of Non-EC 
Nationals – A Critique’ (1992) 3 EJIL 65, discussing especially ECJ, Demirel, 12/86, EU:C:1987:400 and ECJ, Diatta, 
267/83, EU:C:1985:67. The Court has been criticised, however, for failing EU citizens too, at times: Niamh Nic 
Shuibhne, ‘(Some of) The Kids Are Alright: Comment on McCarthy and Dereci’ (2012) 49 CMLRev 349; Gareth 
Davies, ‘The Family Rights of European Children: Expulsion of Non-European Parents’ (2012) EUI Working Papers, 
RSCAS 2012/04; Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Citizenship Without Respect’ (2010) JMWP (NYU Law School) No 08/10.   
43 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council 15, 16 October 1999. A reference to the Presidency Conclusions is 
provided in the Preamble to Directive 2003/109/EC, rec. 2. Para 21 of the European Council Presidency Conclusions 
reads as follows: 
‘The legal status of third-country nationals should be approximated to that of Member States' nationals. A person, 
who has resided legally in a Member State for a period of time to be determined and who holds a long-term 
residence permit, should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to 
those enjoyed by EU citizens; e.g. the right to reside, receive education, and work as an employee or self-employed 
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Directive was a veritable breakthrough in the legal position of the third-country nationals who are long 
term residents, this breakthrough appears to be somewhat timid and fails to solve a number of 
outstanding problems.
44
 The weak points of the Directive are mostly related to the limited nature of the 
free movement right provided, the link made between the residence in one Member State and the 
acquisition of the long-term resident status in the EU, the limited geographical scope of application of 
the Directive, and a total lack of any guarantees of political rights to be by the third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents. 
While providing for the right to free movement,
45
 which is not, in theory at least, essentially different 
from that enjoyed by the European citizens,
46
 the Directive failed to provide for an indispensable and 
essential guarantee of EU nature of the long-term residence of third-country nationals benefitting from 
it. Namely, it failed to fully detach the acquisition of a long term resident status in the EU from the 
permanent residence status of one of the Member States. The Directive thus simply disregards the very 
rationale of the internal market. Those third-country nationals, who resided five years in one Member 
State become entitled to a right to be issued with a long-term residence permit.
47
 It is unfortunate that 
those who resided in the EU for the same period and moved from one Member State to another are not 
covered by the Directive at all.
48
 Given the current state of EU integration, such re-division of the EU 
into the Member States under the Directive is made for no apparent reason and leads, at the same time, 
to the exclusion of a number of actual long-term residents from the status. It is ill-suited and harmful 
for the cause of integration of the third-country nationals in the EU, as it automatically punishes those 
who are most active across the borders and most mobile. Once an EU right is at stake, it should be 
acquired on the basis of the residence in the Union, not in its constituent parts, the Member States. 
Changing the territorial logic of the Directive would not be difficult from a technical point of view: all 
it would take is to allow time of legal residence in the various Member States to be cumulated, thus 
recognising the legally and politically consequential nature of the emerging notion of EU  
territory
49
 – a single living and working space50 – as opposed merely to a sum of the territories of the 
Member States.
51
 That such aggregation of periods of residence in different Member States is 
administratively very well possible is demonstrated by secondary legislation allowing for such in other 
fields.
52
 The flipside of the coin of acquisition of long-term resident’s status under the Directive is the 
loss of this status. Unfortunately, the Directive allows for the loss of the status upon a 12 consecutive 
(Contd.)                                                                  
person, as well as the principle of non-discrimination vis-à-vis the citizens of the state of residence. The European 
Council endorses the objective that long-term legally resident third-country nationals be offered the opportunity to 
obtain the nationality of the Member State in which they are resident’. 
44 See Commission’s Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-country Nationals in the 
European Union, COM(2005) 389 final. See also the criticism by Acosta Arcarazo (n 8) and Wiesbrock (n 8) Thym (n 9) 
734-735. 
45 Art. 14(1), Directive 2003/109/EC. 
46 Notwithstanding the fact that the exercise of such right is made dependent on administrative procedures, such as an 
exchange of a residence permit provided by the previous Member State of residence to that of the new state of residence: 
Art. 15(4), Directive 2003/109/EC. 
47 Art. 4(1), Directive 2003/109/EC. 
48 Unlike the Blue Card Directive, analysed below. 
49 The importance of the notion has been emphasised in Ruiz Zambrano. See also Dimitry Kochenov, ‘A Real European 
Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test; A Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe’ (2011) 18 ColJEuL. 
56; See also Loïc Azoulai, ‘La citoyenneté européenne, un statut d’intégration sociale’ in Mélanges Jean Paul Jacqué. 
Chemins d’Europe (Dalloz 2010). 
50 Oxana Golynker, ‘European Union as a Single Working-Living Space: EU Law and New Forms of Intra-Community 
Migration’ in Andrew Halpin and Volker Roeben (eds), Theorising the Global Legal Order (Hart 2009) 145, 151. 
51 Teresa Pullano, Citoyenneté européenne: Un éspace quasi étatique (Sciences Po 2014). 
52 Regulation 883/2004 EC, on the coordination of social security systems (2004 OJ L 166/1).   
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months’ absence from the EU:53 the stability of the status leaves much to be desired and, crucially, 
bears no logical connection to the acquisition. 
Nevertheless, the very possibility of being issued with a long-term residence permit after five years of 
residence in one of the Member States and the right to exchange it for a similar document in another 
Member State while exercising free movement right is a veritable breakthrough in the European legal 
climate. Unfortunately, however, the long-term residents’ free movement rights do not fully resemble 
the rights of Union citizens. Third-country nationals merely enjoy free movement rights on the basis of 
secondary law, allowing for a more restrictive application of those rights. Whereas Union citizens may 
derive rights directly from the Treaty, even if this is against the criteria in secondary legislation, ‘the 
fulfilment of the conditions provided for in secondary law is condition sine qua non for the existence 
of mobility rights for [third-country nationals’].54 In addition, large groups of third-country nationals 
are excluded from the scope of the Directive,
55
 and Member States may determine the conditions of 
legal residence.
56
 Article 14(3) of the Directive permits the Member States to apply national 
requirements regarding the filling of vacancies and exercise of employed or self-employed activities 
and to give preference to EU citizens and third-country nationals already legally residing in that 
Member State. Additionally, Article 14(4) allows Member States who had already adopted quotas for 
the admission of long-term residents at the moment the Directive was adopted to maintain those.  
Another detriment for the rights under the Directive is that the Member States are, in accordance with 
Article 15(3), allowed to submit long-term residents to national integration test, if no such test has 
been imposed on them in the first Member State. Member States have extensively used this limitation 
to the free movement rights.
57
 Moreover, integration tests in the first Member State can (and do
58
) 
function in such a way, that they objectively obstruct the achievement of the goals of the Directive, 
with a rising number of the Member States adopting identical tests for long-term residence and 
naturalisation.
59
 Additionally, while long-term residents on grounds of Article 11 of the Directive 
enjoy equal treatment with nationals, also this right can be restricted.
60
 According to Article 11(4), 
‘Member States may limit equal treatment in respect of social assistance and social protection to core 
benefits’, but only if the Member States, when implementing the Directive, ‘have stated clearly that 
                                                     
53 Art. 9(1)(c), Directive 2003/109/EC. 
54 Sara Iglesias Sánchez, ‘Free Movement of Third Country Nationals in the European Union? Main Features, Deficiencies 
and Challenges of the new Mobility Rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2009) 15 ELJ 791, 800. See 
also Anja Wiesbrock, ‘Free movement of third-country nationals in the European Union: the illusion of inclusion ’ (2010) 
35 ELRev 455, 459. 
55 Art 3(2), Directive 2003/109/EC.  
56 Singh (n 7) para 40; Case C-40/11 Iida (nyr) par 36.  
57 Wiesbrock (n 55) 462-464.  
58 See, e.g., Kochenov and Dimitrovs (n 22): because of the strictness of the test, the permanent residents of Latvia belonging 
to the ethnic minorities do not fall within the scope of the Directive, creating an absurd situation, where, under Latvian 
law, even being born in the country is not enough to quality as a ‘Long Term Resident’. Implementation like this fully 
strips the Directive of effet utile in the country. 
59 For overviews, see, eg, Christian Joppke, ‘Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western 
Europe’ (2007) 30 West European Politics 1; Ricky van Oers, Eva Ersbøll, Eva and Dora Kostakopoulou (eds), A Re-
definition of Belonging? (Brill 2010); Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Mevrouw de Jong Gaat Eten, EU Citizenship and the Culture 
of Prejudice’ (2011) EUI RSCAS Working Paper.   
60 Article 18 TFEU, the right to non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, is unlikely to be of any relevance. According 
to the ECJ, this provision ‘is not intended to apply to cases of a possible difference in treatment between nationals of 
Member States and nationals of non-member countries’. ECJ, Vatsouras and Koupatantze, C-22/08 and C-23/08, 
EU:C:2009:344. For criticism see: Bruno de Witte, ‘National, EU Citizens and Foreigners: Rethinking Discrimination on 
Grounds of Nationality in EU Law’ in André Alen and others (eds), Liberae Cogitationes. Liber Amicorum Marc Bossuyt 
(Intersentia 2013) 229. 
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they intended to rely on that derogation’.61 Also the family reunification rights of the long-term 
residents do not match those of the Union citizens. While Union citizens who exercise their free 
movement rights are allowed to be accompanied by their family members irrespective of where the 
family ties were established,
62
 family members of moving long-term residents are allowed to 
accompany them ‘when the family was already constituted in the first Member State’.63  
While Directive 2003/109 has significantly improved the rights for third-country nationals, it has not 
to the fullest extent implemented the internal market, which is ‘an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital in ensured…’.64 Remnants of 
previously existing borders still remain – indeed, borders between the Member States are a towering 
presence in the legal reality shaped by the directive.
65
  
If the Directive is to approximate the status of third-country nationals to that of EU citizens,
66
 the 
limited geographical scope undermines this objective. It is unfortunate that the Directive does not 
apply to the UK and Ireland on the one hand and to Denmark on the other: these Member States opted 
out by virtue of Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the Position of the UK and Ireland annexed to the 
Treaties
67
 and Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the Position of Denmark
68
 respectively. 
Contrary to the objectives the EU set itself, the Directive failed to abolish the inferior position of long-
term resident third-country nationals vis-à-vis EU citizens. Being so fortunate to be born with a 
Member State nationality thus continues make a tremendous difference in present-day Europe. This is 
further reinforced by the limited political rights of the third-country national long-term residents of the 
EU.
69
 Not only can they not vote in national elections in their Member State of residence,
70
 but they 
are also deprived of European voting rights and hence do not take part in the elections to the EP.
71
 
Neither does European law require the Member States to allow the third-country national long-term 
residents in their territories to vote in local elections. Although the majority of the Member States have 
adopted legislation allowing third-country nationals to vote in some elections,
72
 the general rule 
remains that the absolute majority of third-country nationals residing in the Community do not enjoy 
                                                     
61 ECJ, Kamberaj, C-571/10, EU:C:2012:233, para 84. For an analysis see: Karin de Vries, ‘Towards integration and equality 
for third-country nationals? Reflections on Kamberaj’ (2013) 38 ELRev 248.  
62 Metock (n 7); O&B (n 7).  
63 Art. 16(1), Directive 2003/109/EC. 
64 Art. 26(2) TFEU. 
65 On how truth is created by law, see, Jack M Balkin, ‘The Proliferation of Legal Truth’ (2003) 26 HarvJLPubPol 5. 
66 Recital 2, Directive 2003/109/EC. 
67 Preamble to Directive 2003/109/EC, rec. 25. 
68 Preamble to Directive 2003/109/EC, rec. 26. 
69 The issue of a new status for the third-country nationals who reside in the EU has been on the EU’s agenda for a very long 
time. See e.g. the EP’s proposal to grant the third-country nationals permanent residents the right to vote in municipal 
elections which dates back to 1988: Bull EC Supp. 1988-2, 29, as cited in Becker (2004) (n 14), 147 and fn. 73. This 
issue has also been discussed at the 1996 IGC: Kostakopoulou, Theodora, ‘Nested “Old” and “New” Citizenships in the 
European Union: Bringing out the Complexity’, 5 Colum. J. Eur. L., 1999, 389, 409, 410. 
70 This is an acute problem also in the context of EU citizenship: Federico Fabbrini, ‘The Political Side of EU Citizenship in 
the Context of EU Federalism’ in Dimitry Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP 
2015) (forthcoming); Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Free Movement and Participation in the Parliamentary Elections in the 
Member State of Nationality: An Ignored Link?’ (2009) 16 MJ 197. 
71 For a recent argument in support of the extension of voting rights for the EP to third-country nationals see: Annette 
Schrauwen, ‘Granting the Right to Vote for the European Parliament to Resident Third-Country Nationals: Civic 
Citizenship Revisited’ (2013) 19 ELJ 201. 
72 At present ‘fifteen [Member States] confer some electoral rights on at least some third-country nationals’: Jo Shaw, The 
Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union: Electoral Rights and the Restructuring of Political Space (CUP 
2007) 13. Needless to say, such rights, when given, have nothing to do with the functioning of the EU legal order. 
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such rights.
73
 Directive 2003/109/EC offered a unique opportunity to extend the franchise  
(in European and local elections at least) to the third-country nationals permanent residents of the EU, 
but it was left unused.
74
 This is notwithstanding the fact that the main political science theories 
underline the importance of integration through voting, as Lardy has demonstrated.
75
  
National law of the Member States could be deployed to remedy this situation. Given that the 
possibility of introducing an all-European procedure for the EP elections spelled out in Article 223 
TFEU has not yet been used, it is up to the Member States themselves to decide who qualifies to take 
part in such elections. As long as this right is not used by the Member States in breach of the right of 
Union citizens residing in a Member State of which he is not a national to vote and stand as candidate 
for EP elections under the same conditions as the nationals of that state, as laid down in Article 22(2) 
TFEU,
76
 the Member States are free to extend the voting right to any person in their territory.
77
  
The ECJ has been clear on this issue, underlining the fact that the Union citizenship rights are not 
exclusive and can thus be granted to those who are not in possession of this status.
78
 
Regarding the extension of national and local franchise, the Member States seem to retain even more 
sovereignty, perfectly able to include third-country nationals in the democratic process.
79
 Examples 
are already numerous: Commonwealth citizens residing in the UK may vote in the UK elections at all 
levels, subject to reciprocity;
80
 Brazilian citizens residing in Portugal can vote at national and 
municipal level there;
81
 a large number of Member States offer third-country nationals a vote at the 
municipal level. It is regrettable, however, that there is no common approach in all EU Member States 
to this issue. It is not possible but to agree with Jo Shaw that ‘the lack of competence is often raised as 
                                                     
73 This is due to a number of factors, ranging from the lengthy national residence requirements which have to be met in order 
to qualify for enfranchisement to the simple fact that the third-country nationals are mostly enfranchised in the smallest 
Member States while in Italy, Poland, France and Germany, where the majority of them reside, they have no right to vote. 
See Shaw (n 72), 13. For an overview of non-citizens’ voting rights in the Member States see ibid. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 at 
78–80. 
74 Shaw argued that the legal basis of the Directive (now Art. 79 TFEU) did not allow for the grant of political rights to the 
third-country nationals: Shaw (n 72) 14. Given the all-encompassing scope of Directive 2003/109/EC and the importance 
of political representation for the long-term residents the claim of lacking legal basis for the enfranchisement of the third-
country nationals seems over-pessimistic. The Commission, however, was of the same opinion: there is no legal basis for 
enfranchising third-country nationals in the Treaties (See Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Status of 
Third-country nationals Who Are Long-Term Residents, COM(2001) 127 final, para 5.5 of the Explanatory 
Memorandum (OJ 2001 C 240E/79). For discussion see Shaw (n 72), 222–227. A new legal basis has appeared in the 
Lisbon Treaty. According to Art. 79(4) TFEU, the Union will be able to adopt ‘measures to provide incentives and 
support for the action of the Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing 
legally in their territories’.  
75 Heather Lardy, ‘Citizenship and the Right to Vote’ (1997) 17 OxJLSt 75, 97, 98. 
76 ECJ, Spain v. UK, C-145/04, EU:C:2006:543, para 66. 
77 Also in the US arguments have been made in the literature that the States should legally be able to extend the franchise also 
to the persons who are not in possession of a US citizenship status: Elise Brozovich, ‘Prospects for Democratic Change: 
Non-citizen Suffrage in America’ (2002) 23 Hamline J. Pub. L. and Pol’y 403. It has even been argued that non-citizens’ 
suffrage is a requirement following from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Gerard M Roseberg, 
‘Aliens and Equal Protection: Why not the Right to Vote?’ (1977) 75 MichLRev 1092, 1112.  
78 Spain v. UK (n 76) para 78. 
79 The Member States of the CoE have been ‘recommended’ to move in this direction by a PACE Rerport: PACE Report 
(Manuela Aguiar and Ana Guirado, Rapporteurs), ‘Links between Europeans Living Abroad and their Countries of 
Origin’, PACE Doc. 8339 of 5 March 1999, point 5(v)(d)(v) (about local elections in the host country). The possibility to 
allow resident non-nationals to vote in national elections has also been seriously discussed, especially in the States 
traditionally granting foreigners political participation rights at the national level. See e.g. Ko-Chih R Tung, ‘Voting 
Rights for Alien Residents – Who Wants It?’ (1985) 19 Int Migration Rev 451 (discussing the Swedish case). 
80 For an analysis, see section III(d) infra. 
81 PACE Report (Manuela Aguiar and Ana Guirado, Rapporteurs), ‘Links between Europeans Living Abroad and their 
Countries of Origin’, PACE Doc. 8339 of 5 March 1999, para 78. 
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the argument for the failure to adopt measures, but it is clear that in this area it is the absence of 
political will to enact such measures which is just as great a problem’.82 
While Directive 2003/109/EC succeeded in introducing the first, albeit limited, free movement right to 
be enjoyed by the third-country nationals who are long term residents of the Union, it is up to the 
Member States to continue on the path of inclusion of this group of EU residents. At present, third-
country nationals are still ‘une population infériorisée en droits, donc aussi en dignité’.83 In doing so, 
the EU ignores the goals it set for itself and applies an entirely different legal reality to long-term 
resident third-country nationals, ignoring the requirements of the internal market, thereby bringing 
about a diminished importance of the European Union. Most importantly, a large group of Europeans, 
who have resided most if not all their lives within the EU, are still not treated as such by the EU, 
simply because they happen to lack EU citizenship status.  
Sectoral Legislation 
Other than the long-term residents Directive, which produces a more or less overall policy approach to 
third-country nationals residing within the EU, the Union has also adopted sectoral legislation on the 
admission and free movement of specific groups of third-country nationals. This legislation may be 
divided into two subcategories. The first concerns legislation on the admission and free movement of 
students and researchers and the second – ordinary labour migration. What all sectoral legislation 
shares is that it extends (to a limited extent) particular rights possessed by Union citizens to certain 
limited categories of third-country nationals. Not all Member States have decided to partake in the 
legislation, unfortunately. The geographical scope of the Directives is limited. The United Kingdom 
and Denmark have decided to opt out from the application of all Directives. Ireland has decided to 
participate only in the adoption and application of the Researchers Directive
84
 and opted out from all 
other Directives.  
Directive 2004/114/EEC, the ‘Students’ Directive’,85 offers a right to free movement to third-country 
nationals who have been admitted as a student by a first Member State. This right is subject to 
numerous conditions however.
86
 Not only does the student from a third country again have to fulfil the 
same conditions which also had to fulfilled for access in the first Member State,
87
 the student also has 
to participate in a community or bilateral exchange program or has to have been ‘admitted as a student 
in a Member State for no less than two years’,88 unless ‘the student (…) is obliged to attend a part of 
his/her courses in an establishment of another Member State’.89 A Commission assessment has 
demonstrated that third-country national students often face difficulties when exercising their right to 
free movement.
90
 
                                                     
82 Shaw (n 72) 232. 
83 Etienne Balibar, Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières l’État, le peuple (La découverte 2001) 192. 
84 Recital 27 of Directive 2004/114/EC. 
85 Council Directive 2004/114/EC. 
86 See for analysis also Yves Pascouau, ‘Intra-EU Mobility: The “Second Building Block” of EU Labour Migration Policy’ 
(2013) EPC Paper No 74; Wiesbrock (n 55) 465-468. 
87 See Art. 6 and 7 of Directive 2004/114/EC. 
88 Art 8(1c) of Directive 2004/114/EC. 
89 Art 8(2) of Directive 2004/114/EC. 
90 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of Directive 2004/114/EC on 
the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training 
or  voluntary service (COM(2011) 587 final) 16. 
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A largely identical picture emerges from Directive 2005/71/EC, the ‘Researchers’ Directive’.91 This 
Directive lays down the admission conditions for researchers from third countries. Article 13 of the 
Researchers’ Directive offers the researchers falling within its scope the right to move to a second 
Member State to carry out part of the research there, but no general mobility right. In addition, not all 
Member States have transposed the researchers’ right to free movement in national legislation, 
potentially further weakening this right.
92
 Researchers from third countries also enjoy the right to 
equal treatment as regards the recognition of diplomas, working conditions, certain social benefits, tax 
benefits, and access to goods and services.
93
  
To overcome some of the deficiencies, related amongst others to the lack of enforcement, clarity, and 
restrictive free movement rights, and to bring the legislation in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy, 
which aim is to foster ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the EU,94  the Commission has 
presented a proposal for a new Directive, which would cover those falling within the scope of both 
existing Directives as well as au pairs and remunerated trainees.
95
 Although it is uncertain what the 
outcome of the negotiations will be, the proposal contains several aspects which will improve the 
position of those covered by the Directive. The Commission intends to strengthen the free movement 
rights of researchers and students. The requirement for students to have to participate in an exchange 
program or to have been admitted as student for over two years, to give an example, is dropped in the 
proposal.
96
 The proposal also improves the family rights of researchers.
97
 The Commission 
additionally intends to create the right for researchers and students to stay in the Member State for 
another year after the completion of the studies or research in order to find a job or set up a business.
98
 
The position of students and researchers would thus be considerably improved should these proposals 
be adopted. That the Commission has chosen for a more uniform legislation covering multiple groups 
instead of the current sectoral approach is in itself to be welcomed.  
Just like in the case of students and researchers, the labour migration legislation is characterised by its 
sectoral character. The Member States have always been hesitant about the adoption of a uniform 
labour migration policy.
99
 Although the Treaty of Lisbon has brought migration policy within the 
scope of the ordinary legislative procedure, no longer mandating unanimous agreement for the 
adoption of legislation,
100
 the economic crisis, anti-migration tendencies, and institutional issues have 
made it difficult to develop one coherent policy.
101
 In recent years, nonetheless, new legislation has 
been adopted, expanding the reach of the EU’s labour migration policies. 
                                                     
91 Council Directive 2005/71/EC. 
92 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of Directive 2005/71/EC on a 
specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research (COM(2011)901) 7. 
93 Art. 12 of Directive 2005/71/EC. 
94 Communication from the Commission on Europe 2020, a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
(COM(2010)2020. 
95 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, pupil exchange, remunerated and unremunerated training, 
voluntary service and au pairing (COM(2013) 151 final). 
96 See Art. 26 of the Proposal. 
97 See Art. 28 of the Proposal. 
98 See Art. 24 of the Proposal.  
99 The Member States rejected the Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence for the purpose 
of paid employment and self- employment activities (COM(2001) 386 final). For that reason, the Commission decided to 
focus on specific groups of economic migrants in its 2005 Policy Plan on Legal Migration. Communication from the 
Commission, Policy Plan on Legal Migration (COM(2005) 669 final). Carrera and others (n 13); Pascouau (n 86) 1. 
100 Art. 79 TFEU. 
101 Pascouau  (n 86) 5-6. 
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The first piece of legislation to be adopted in the field of labour migration was the so-called ‘Blue-
Card Directive’ in 2009, establishing rules on the entry and residence of highly qualified employees.102 
Those in the possession of a valid work contract for highly qualified work of at least one year can 
apply for a Blue Card.
103
 The Directive grants those in possession of a Blue Card a number of rights. 
Blue Card holders have the right to be treated equally with regard, for example, to working conditions, 
educational and vocational training, and certain branches of social security.
104
 The Blue Card Directive 
also allows Blue Card holders to take up residence in another Member State after 18 months of 
residence in the first Member State
105
 and to be joined by their family members there.
106
 The Blue 
Card Directive makes the family reunification Directive and the long-term residents Directive 
applicable to Blue Card holders, with certain derogations.
107
 Because of those derogations, Blue Card 
holders at times find themselves in a better position than ‘ordinary’ third-country nationals. Most 
importantly, contrary to ‘ordinary’ third country nationals, Blue Card holders can accumulate the 
periods of residence in different Member States for the calculation of the residence terms required in 
order to benefit from both Directives.
108
 While the Blue Card Directive is, thus, more in line with the 
general rationale of EU integration and the creation of a single working and living space in Europe – 
in the memorable terminology of Oxana Golynker
109
 – than those two Directives,110 one might wonder 
whether there is any legitimate justification for such different treatment between Blue Card holders 
and other legally residing third-country nationals other than the market value of the Blue Card 
holders.
111
 While it might from an economic perspective appear reasonable to provide economically 
more valuable persons with more advantageous rights, to privilege this group over third-country 
nationals that have resided within the EU for a lengthy period, if not most of their lives, is to send a 
negative signal to this group.  
Despite its expansive scope, a recent Commission report highlighted many shortcomings.
112
 In the 
majority of the Member States, only very little use has been made of the Blue Card, which can be 
explained by the fact that Member States have maintained the right to adopt national policies for 
attracting highly qualified migrants.
113
 Some Member States have also made use of the possibility, 
provided by the Blue Card Directive, to set restrictions on the volumes of admission.
114
 Article 5(3) of 
the Directive, in addition, determines that the gross salary of highly qualified employees ‘shall be  
at least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary in the Member State concerned’. This provision 
poses a significant obstacle to the attraction of highly skilled young workers, who have not yet 
                                                     
102 Council Directive 2009/50/EC. For an elaborate analysis of the Directive see Steve Peers, ‘Legislative Update: EC 
Immigration and Asylum Law. Attracting and Deterring Labour Migration: The Blue Card and the Employer Sanctions 
Directive’ (2009) 11 EuJML 387. 
103 Art. 5(1)(a) of Directive 2009/50/EC. 
104 Art. 14 of Directive 2009/50/EC.  
105 Art. 18 of Directive 2009/50/EC. 
106 Art. 19 of Directive 2009/50/EC. 
107 Art. 15 and 16 of Directive 2009/50/EC. 
108 Art. 15(7) and 16(2) of Directive 2009/50/EC. 
109 Golynker (n 52). 
110 See the analysis of the Long-Term Residents Directive above, particularly footnote 49. 
111 Carrera and others (n 13) 4. 
112 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of Directive 
2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified 
employment (COM(2014) 287 final). 
113 Art. 3(4) of Directive 2009/50/EC. See also Communication from the Commission on the implementation of Directive 
2009/50/EC, 4. 
114 Art. 6 of Directive 2009/50/EC. See also Communication from the Commission on the implementation of Directive 
2009/50/EC, 4-5. 
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obtained such salary levels.
115
 Several Member States have implemented the option for performing  
a labour market test,
116
 which allows them to examine whether vacancies cannot be filled by their 
nationals or other EU citizens. Additionally, the standard period of validity of the Blue Card has been 
set at. or close to, the absolute minimum in most Member States
117
 and several Member States have 
used the derogation possibilities provided for in the Directive to limit the right to equal treatment as 
regards study loans and grants and access to University and post-secondary education.
118
 Several 
Member States seem to have implemented the Blue Card Directive in such a way as to make 
applications as unattractive as possible. While it might be too early to draw final conclusions about the 
impact of the Blue Card Directive, the currently existing disparities between the Member States as 
well as the information available about the applications for a Blue Card make one wonder whether the 
Directive in its current form can contribute at all to making the Union ‘the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’.119 
The proposal for a Blue Card Directive was accompanied by a proposal for a ‘Single Permit 
Directive’,120 which was adopted in 2011.121 The Single Permit Directive lays down the most general 
rules on labour migration.
122
 The Directive applies to third-country nationals who have been admitted 
to a Member State for the purpose of work, or who apply to reside in a Member State for the purpose 
of work.
123
 Those covered by other sectoral legislation are excluded from the scope of the Single 
Permit Directive. Those covered by the Directive are enabled to obtain residence permits via a single 
procedure and provided with a common set of rights,
124
 such as the right to enter and reside in and 
move throughout the territory of the Member State, as well as the right to exercise the concrete 
employment activity.
125
 Additionally, the Directive provides the third-country nationals with equal 
treatment rights in the areas of, for example, working conditions, educational and vocational training, 
certain branches of social security, and tax benefits.
126
 It is too early to assess the effects of the 
Directive, also because most Member States have failed to adopt the Directive in time.
127
 Looking at 
the Directive’s provisions and considering the experience with the Blue Card Directive, however, one 
may wonder how effective it will be. Also this Directive ‘is without prejudice to the Member States’ 
powers concerning the admission of third-country nationals to their labour markets’.128 Member States 
may thus adopt national policies on the admission of workers from third countries. The interest in the 
                                                     
115 Peers (n 101) 407. 
116 Art. 8(2) of Directive 2009/50/EC. See also Communication from the Commission on the implementation of Directive 
2009/50/EC, 7. 
117 According to Art. 7(2) of Directive 2009/50/EC, ‘Member States shall set a standard period of validity of the  EU Blue 
Card, which shall be comprised between one and four years’. Most Member States set the period of validity at one or two 
years. Communication from the Commission on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC, 6.  
118 Art. 14(2) of Directive 2009/50/EC. See also Communication from the Commission on the implementation of Directive 
2009/50/EC, 9. 
119 Which is according to recital 3 one of the reasons for the adoption of the Blue Card Directive. 
120 Proposal for a Council Directive on a single application procedure for a single permit for third- country nationals to reside 
and work in the territory of a member state and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a 
member state (COM(2007) 638 final). 
121 Directive 2011/98/EU.  
122 Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (OUP 2011) 434. 
123 Art. 3 of Directive 2011/98/EU. 
124 Art. 1(1) of Directive 2011/98/EU. 
125 Art. 11 of Directive 2011/98/EU. 
126 Art. 12 of Directive 2011/98/EU. 
127http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/eu-law-and-monitoring/infringements_by_policy_ 
immigration_and_integration_en.htm (last visited: 19-08-2014). 
128 Art. 1(2) of Directive 2011/98/EU. 
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EU Single Permit might, therefore, be limited. Third-country nationals who are allowed to enter the 
EU on the basis of a Single Permit are, in addition, given fewer rights than Blue Card holders. 
Contrary to the Blue Card Directive, the Single Permit Directive does not grant the right to move to 
another Member State, nor a right to family reunification. Family reunification is thus only open for 
Permit Holders if they fulfil the conditions set in Directive 2003/86/EC on family reunification, which, 
as discussed above, are more restrictive than the conditions for Blue Card Holders. Whether much use 
will be made of the Single Permit thus appears uncertain.   
Two new Directives were added to the existing secondary law on labour migration in 2014. The first is 
the Seasonal Workers’ Directive,129 which sets out rules as regards entry and stay of seasonal workers 
from third countries. Chapter II of this Directive determines the conditions for admission as well as 
grounds for rejection of a request for or withdrawal of an authorisation to work. Member States may 
still determine the volumes of admission, which can be a ground for rejection of the application for an 
authorisation for the purpose of seasonal work.
130
 Member States are also allowed to give preference 
to Union citizens or third-country nationals legally residing within the EU when filling vacancies.
131
 
Holders of an authorisation to stay enjoy the right to enter and stay in and move throughout the 
territory of the Member State, as well as the right to exercise the concrete employment activity.
132
 
Seasonal workers also enjoy the right to equal treatment as regards specific areas, such as the terms of 
employment, certain branches of social security, educational and vocational training, and recognition 
of diplomas.
133
 Member States are, however, allowed to limit equal treatment by excluding family 
benefits and unemployment benefits,
134
 limiting access only to training which is directly linked to the 
job and by excluding study and maintenance grants and loans.
135
 Seasonal workers do not have the 
right to move to another Member State or the right to bring their family. The rights enjoyed by 
seasonal workers are thus in no way comparable with those enjoyed by Union citizens. Since seasonal 
workers are allowed to stay for a maximum period of five to nine months, to be determined by the 
Member States individually,
136
 they will also never be able to fulfil the conditions for becoming a 
legally residing long-term resident. Of all those third-country nationals legally residing within the EU, 
seasonal workers find themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy. 
This is not the case for those persons falling within the scope of the intra-corporate transferees 
Directive,
137
 which sets out rules on the entry and residence of third-country nationals in the 
framework of an intra-corporate transfer. Most of the Directive is devoted to outlining the admission 
conditions, grounds for rejection and withdrawal, and application procedures. An analysis of the rights 
demonstrates that intra-corporate transferees are in the possession of rights much more beneficial than 
those of seasonal workers and Single Permit holders. Also intra-corporate transferees enjoy the right to 
enter and stay in and move throughout the territory of the Member State, the right to exercise the 
concrete employment activity,
138
 and the right to equal treatment with Member State nationals in 
certain areas.
139
 In addition, intra-corporate transferees enjoy family reunification rights which are 
more beneficial than those enjoyed by other third-country nationals, including Single Permit holders, 
                                                     
129 Directive 2014/36/EU.  
130 Art. 7 of Directive 2014/36/EU. 
131 Art. 8(3) of Directive 2014/36/EU. 
132 Art. 22 of Directive 2014/36/EU. 
133 Art. 23 of Directive 2014/36/EU. 
134 Art. 23(1) of Directive 2014/36/EU. 
135 Art. 23(2)(i) of Directive 2014/36/EU. 
136 Art. 23(2)(ii) of Directive 2014/36/EU. 
137 Directive 2014/66/EU. 
138 Art. 17 of Directive 2014/66/EU. 
139 Art. 18 of Directive 2014/66/EU. 
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under the family reunification Directive.
140
 The Directive also grants mobility rights to intra-corporate 
transferees. Third-country nationals in the possession of an intra-corporate transferee permit enjoy, 
subject to certain conditions, short-term mobility rights, which entitles them to reside and work in 
another Member State ‘for a period of up to 90 days in any 180-day period per Member State’.141 
Intra-corporate transferees also enjoy the right to stay and work in a second Member State for a period 
exceeding 90 days.
142
 The second Member States, however, may decide to apply procedures whereby 
it can check the intention of those using the mobility rights.
143
 Would Member States decide to adopt 
those procedures, it would impose serious constraints on the right to free movement of intra-corporate 
transferees. 
This brief overview demonstrates that there is huge variation between the sectoral legislation granting 
rights to third-country nationals. The complexity is further aggravated by the room for manœuvre left 
to the Member States when implementing the legislation and the overlap with other secondary 
legislation setting out entitlements for third-country nationals. Such an intricate system of rights and 
entitlements not merely undermines the clarity but likely also the effectiveness of the policies. While 
policies have to be tailored to different categories of third-country nationals, allowing for certain 
differences between the different regimes, one may wonder what justifies current variations, other than 
the perceived need by the Member States to limit a common EU approach to such issues to the furthest 
extent. Why should Blue Card holders be entitled to better family reunification rights than Single 
Permit holders and, possibly even worse, those third-country nationals who are long-term residents? 
Reasons for making a distinction between different groups of persons may exist, but some of the 
current distinctions raise a legitimate suspicion that the legislation in question seems to be motivated 
mainly by economic and anti-migration considerations.
144
  
Commonwealth Citizens Residing in the UK 
Commonwealth citizens residing in the UK represent a unique group of third-country nationals in the 
EU as far as rights of political participation are concerned.
145
 Although free movement rights do not 
apply to them,
146
 they enjoy more rights in the field of democratic representation than European 
citizens from the continent who moved to the UK in exercise of their Article 21 TFEU free movement 
right. Given that Article 22 TFEU does not provide for political participation of European citizens 
residing in a Member State other than their own at the level of the national parliaments, the unique 
position of the qualifying Commonwealth citizens who can elect and be elected to the House of 
Commons becomes clear. Moreover, Commonwealth citizens residing in the UK also participate in 
local and European elections. Regarding the latter, the ECJ has been explicit in dismissing the claims 
that enfranchising those persons who are not in possession of European citizen status is contrary to 
Community law. In Spain v. UK the Court supported the UK’s constitutional tradition of enfranchising 
                                                     
140 See Art. 19 of Directive 2014/66/EU, in particular all derogations from the family reunification Directive contained 
therein. 
141 Art. 21(1) of Directive 2014/66/EU. 
142 Art. 22 of Directive 2014/66/EU. 
143 Art. 21(2-9) and Art 22(1-7) of Directive 2014/66/EU. 
144 See for this argument also Thym (n 9) 731-732. 
145 Maltese and Cypriot nationals residing in the UK enjoy a special status by virtue of being both Commonwealth citizens 
and EU citizens, hence being able to enjoy the best of both worlds. The same also applies to Irish nationals, who, 
although not Commonwealth citizens, enjoy a special status when residing in the UK. This section focuses exclusively on 
the discussion of the legal position of those Commonwealth citizens residing in the UK who are not also European 
citizens. 
146 Preamble to Directive 2003/109/EC, rec. 25. 
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the Commonwealth citizens, including their right to be elected to the EP.
147
 In other words, the ECJ 
made it clear that the scopes of European citizens and voters in the EP elections differ:
148
 a formal 
European citizenship status is not necessary to be enfranchised.
149
 
There is no strong argument available in the literature on the topic for the exclusion of those who are 
not in possession of EU citizenship status from the right to participate in EP elections. Davis 
reasonably called for the extension of the right to vote in all elections all persons meeting certain 
residency requirements.
150
 In fact, although Spain, making an argument in Spain v. UK seemed to 
presume that a strong link exists between nationality and the right to vote in national and European 
elections,
151
 the history of the development of the concept of citizenship does not support this point of 
view.
152
 Even when the view that ‘foreigners’ should not be entitled to vote prevails, there is always a 
possibility  of creating a legal status that would fit in-between being a citizen and an alien. In the UK, 
where the English Parliament prohibited foreigners from voting as early as in 1698,
153
 a category of 
Commonwealth citizens and Irish nationals
154
 falls outside that of aliens, thus qualifying these groups 
of people, when residents in the UK,
155
 for the franchise. A similar practice also existed in the US.
156
 
In the European context it would be reasonable to link such status to a particular period of residence in 
the EU as a whole, not in one particular Member State. 
The legal situation of Commonwealth citizens who are not nationals of Malta or Cyprus residing in the 
UK in the fields other than democratic representation is, because of British opt outs, very weak. 
Unlike third-country national long-term residents residing in other Member States, they cannot rely on 
the free movement provisions of Directive 2003/109/EC, or, indeed, benefit from any sectoral 
legislation discussed above. Also, once a Commonwealth citizen transfers residence from the UK  
to another Member State, he or she loses the democratic representation rights which he or she used to 
enjoy in the UK, losing the right to vote in all elections in the new state of residence. 
                                                     
147 Spain v. UK (n 76) para 78: ‘In the current state of Community law, the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to 
stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament falls within the competence of each Member State in 
compliance with Community law, […] Articles 189 EC, 17 EC and 19 EC do not preclude the Member States from 
granting that right to vote and to stand as candidate to certain persons who have close links with them, other than their 
own nationals or citizens of the Union resident in that territory’. 
148 For details see, e.g., Fabbrini (n 70).  
149 This decision of the ECJ echoes the famous ruling of the US Supreme Court in Pope v. Williams: ‘the privilege to vote in 
a state is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be exercised as the state may direct, and upon such terms as to it may 
seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals, in violation of the Federal Constitution. 
The state might provide that persons of foreign birth could vote without being naturalized…’Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 
621, 632 (1904). 
150 Davis (2002) (n 3) 132. 
151 Spain v. UK (n 76) para 37. 
152 Lardy (n 75). 
153 Ibid 75 and fn. 2. 
154 Irish nationals are not ‘alien’ just as Ireland is not a ‘foreign country’ under the 1949 Ireland Act. Consequently, Irish 
citizens enjoy more rights than ‘foreigners’ would. So Irish citizens residing in the UK can both elect and be elected to 
the national legislature: Electoral Administration Act 2006, Art. 18(1)(b); Representation of People Act 2000, Art. 
6(3)(e). To reciprocate this right, Ireland allowed UK nationals residing there to vote for the lower house of parliament 
(Dáil): Shaw (n 72) 13. 
155 Neither Commonwealth citizens not Irish nationals can register in the UK as overseas voters, meaning that moving their 
residence outside the UK terminates their voting rights in that country, including, in the case of the Commonwealth 
citizens, EP voting rights. 
156 Several States used to allow those residents, who registered their intention to become US citizens to vote, while other 
aliens were not given that privilege. See Jamin B Raskin, ‘Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional 
and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage’ (1993) 141 UPaLRev 1391, 1418. 
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Yet, the political rights enjoyed by the Commonwealth citizens residing in the UK are very telling in 
many respects. Most importantly, they permit examination of the ties between the Member States of 
the EU from a fresh perspective. Is it not problematic, for instance, that for the purpose of voting in 
national elections the ties between the UK and the countries of the Commonwealth appear stronger 
than between the UK and other Member States of the EU
157
? It is difficult to justify from the point of 
view of common sense that a Dutchmen residing permanently in London has fewer political rights in 
the UK than a citizen of Mozambique residing next door, none of the two nations having any historical 
ties with the Crown. Most importantly, however, the political rights of the Commonwealth nationals in 
the UK show with all clarity that enfranchisement of non-citizens is possible and that no Community 
action is required for this.
158
  
Third-country Nationals’ Rights under International Agreements 
Although the international agreements with their countries of nationality provide third-country 
nationals with certain rights,
159
 it is difficult to speak of “citizenship” rights in such a context – should 
one have all the richness of the palette of the existing agreements in mind. This is because the majority 
of agreements concluded by the Community and the Member States with the third countries do not 
contain any provisions related either to free movement of the nationals of those states residing in the 
EU, or to the rights to participate in the political life of the Union, or the Member States. However, 
there are a number of agreements that contain provisions somewhat comparable to the European 
citizenship rights. Three agreements are particularly relevant in this respect: the EEA (European 
Economic Area) Agreement,
160
 covering Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway; an Agreement on the free 
movement of persons with Switzerland;
161
 and the Association Agreement with Turkey (Ankara 
Agreement).
162
 None of these provide for any political participation rights. As far as free movement 
rights are concerned, however, the picture is quite different. 
The agreement concluded with the EEA States is the most advanced in this regard. The purpose of the 
agreement, as explained by the ECJ in UK v. Council, ‘is to provide for the fullest possible realisation 
of the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the whole EEA, so that the 
internal market established within the European Union is extended to the EFTA States’.163 The EEA 
agreement is based on the principle of homogeneity. Therefore, as soon as relevant EU legislation has 
                                                     
157 Except Ireland, Malta and Cyprus. 
158 Especially given the ‘green light’ to such practice in Spain v. UK (n 75). 
159 See generally Hedemann-Robinson (n 9); García Andrada (n 9).  
160 OJ 1994 L1/3. For analysis, see, Harvard Haukeland Fredriksen, ‘Bridging the Widening Gap Between the EU Treaties 
and the Agreement on the European Economic Area’ (2012) 18 ELJ 868; M Elvira Méndez-Pinedo, EC and EEA Law: A 
Comparative Study of the Effectiveness of European Law (Europa Publishing 2009); Carl Baudenbacher (ed), Judicial 
Protection in the European Economic Area (German Law Publishers 2012); Adam Łazowski, ‘Enhanced Multilateralism 
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161 OJ 2002 L114/6. For analysis, see, Steve Peers, ‘The EC-Switzerland Agreement on Free Movement of Persons: 
Overview and Analysis (2000) 2 EuJML 127; Marius Vahl and Nina Grolimund, Integration Without Membership: 
Switzerland’s Bilateral Agreements With the European Union’ (CEPS 2006); Francesco Maiani, Roman Petrov, and 
Ekatarina Mouliarova (eds), ‘European Integration Without EU Membership: Models, Experiences, Perspectives’ (2009) 
EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2009/10, 103-135; Łazowski (n 158). 
162 OJ 1973 C113/2. See also the Additional Protocol of 1970 (OJ 1972 L 293) and the Association Council Decisions 1/80 
and 3/80. Nicola Rogers, ‘Movement of Persons (Association Agreement with Turkey)’ in Andrea Ott and Kirstyn Inglis 
(eds), Handbook on European Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process (T.M.C. Asser Press 2002), 
495; Narin Tezcan-Idriz, ‘Free Movement of Persons Between Turkey and the EU: To Move or not to Move? The 
Response of the Judiciary’ (2009) 46 CMLRev 1621. 
163 ECJ, United Kingdom v Council, C-431/11, EU:C:2013:589, para 50. For an analysis see Nicolas Rennuy and Peter Van 
Elsuwege, ‘Integration without membership and the dynamic development of EU law: United Kingdom v Council (EEA)’ 
(2014) 51 CMLRev 935. 
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been adopted, the EEA Joint Committee must decide how to amend the EEA agreement, to permit ‘a 
simultaneous application’ of the Union legislation and the EEA agreement.164 Additionally, the 
principle of homogeneity establishes the requirement ‘to arrive at as uniform an interpretation as 
possible of the provisions of the Agreement and those provisions of Community legislation’.165 By 
virtue of this agreement, EEA nationals have free movement rights which are almost identical to those 
of European citizens, yet, as they clearly do not hold nationalities of any of the Member States, they 
are not EU citizens. EEA nationals can work and reside freely in any Member State of the EU if they 
fall within the EU meaning of the notion of “workers”,166 are self-employed,167 provide services,168 or 
are students, pensioners, or persons of independent means. The homogeneous application of the law 
on the free movement of persons is somewhat undermined by the non-application of the EU 
citizenship provisions to the EEA states.  Articles 20 TFEU and 21 TFEU have not been reproduced in 
the EEA agreement. Consequently, of the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC (the Citizenship 
Directive), only those dealing with the free movement of workers are incorporated into the EEA 
agreement.
169
 It might be difficult, however, to separate the free movement provisions for the 
economically active from the ‘EU citizenship’ provisions. It is thus likely that EEA nationals will also 
benefit to some extent from the more beneficial rules for EU citizens.
170
 The free movement rights of 
the EEA nationals are thus likely to be almost as substantive as those of European citizens, making 
them a very special and the most privileged group of third country nationals known to EU law. 
The same largely applies to the EC-Switzerland Agreement. The bilateral agreements do not extend 
the application of all four freedoms to Switzerland.
171
 With regard to the free movement of persons, to 
be found in Annex I, however, not many differences can be detected between the EC-Switzerland 
Agreement and the EEA Agreement. The former expresses the intention ‘to bring about the free 
movement of persons between them on the basis of the rules applying in the European Community’.172 
The EC-Switzerland Agreement is, however, slightly narrower in scope. This is mostly due to the 
static nature of the Agreement. Due to the absence of a principle of homogeneity, Switzerland is not 
under an obligation to incorporate legislative amendments or take into account the case law of the ECJ 
delivered after the signing of the Agreement.
173
 The ECJ confirmed in Xhymshiti that legislative 
amendments not mentioned in the Annexes of the EC-Switzerland Agreement do not apply to German 
residents working in Switzerland.
174
 Also the provisions on the freedom to provide services in Annex I 
are of a limited nature. The Agreement protects only the provision of cross-border services for a 
period not exceeding 90 days per calendar year.
175
 Nationals of contracting states carrying out cross-
border services for a period exceeding 90 days may, therefore, ‘not derive any rights on the provision 
                                                     
164 Art. 102(1) EEA. 
165 Art. 105(1) EEA. 
166 Art. 28 EEA, Annexes V and VI. 
167 Art. 31 EEA. 
168 Art. 36 EEA. 
169 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee 158/2007 amending Annex V (free movement of workers) and Annex VIII (Right 
of establishment) to the EEA Agreement (OJ 2008 L124/20). For an analysis see Marc Mareseau, ‘On the external 
dimension of Directive 2004/38/EC’ in Inge Govaere and Dominik Hanf (eds), Scrutinizing Internal and External 
Dimensions of European Law (Peter Lang 2013). See also Rennuy and Van Elsuwege (n 161) 948-949. 
170 See to this also the EFTA-Court cases E-4/11 Arnulf Clauder [2013] and E-15/12 Jan Anfinn Wahl [2013]. 
171 The bilateral law, for example, do not cover the free movement of capital. The ECJ has, therefore, explicitly classified 
Switzerland as a third country with regard to this freedom. ECJ, Fokus Invest, C-541/08, EU:C:2010:74, para 49. 
172 Preamble to the EC-Switzerland Agreement, second recital.  
173 Art. 16(2) and 17 EC-Switzerland Agreement. 
174 ECJ, Xhymshiti, C-247/09 EU:C:2010:698, paras 35-39. See also ECJ, Hliddal and Bornand, C-216/12 & C-217/12, 
EU:C:2013:568, para 38. 
175 Article 17 Annex I EC-Switzerland Agreement. 
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of services from the provisions of the Agreement’.176 The limited scope of the right to non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality further diminishes the protection cross-border service 
providers may derive from the Agreement. In Hengartner, the ECJ confirmed that Article 2 of the 
Agreement only prohibits such discrimination ‘where the situation of those nationals falls within the 
material scope of the provisions of Annexes I to III to the Agreement’.177 Since the Annexes do not 
contain ‘any specific rule intended to allow recipients of services to benefit from the principle of non-
discrimination in connection with the application of fiscal provisions relating to the commercial 
transactions’,178 the Austrian authorities were allowed to impose higher taxes on Swiss nationals 
receiving services in Austria than on EU citizens doing so. 
Employed and self-employed persons enjoy a far more extensive right to non-discrimination on the 
basis of nationality, which is very similar if not equal to the same right enjoyed by Union citizens 
residing in other Member States. In Graf and Engel, the ECJ held the case law prohibiting both direct 
and indirect discrimination to be applicable to the Agreement.
179
 In Bergström and Ettwein, this right 
was further extended. The German authorities did not allow Mr and Mrs Ettwein, German nationals 
residing in Switzerland and working on a self-employed basis in Germany, to benefit from the same 
tax benefits as German nationals residing in Germany. Contra the advice of the Commission
180
 and the 
Advocate General,
181
 the ECJ held that self-employed frontier workers ‘may also claim rights under 
the Agreement against their own country’.182 Mr and Mrs Epstein were, therefore, allowed to invoke 
the right to equal treatment against the German authorities. In Bergström, the applicant was allowed to 
invoke the Agreement’s provisions on social security as well as Regulation 1408/71/EEC on the 
application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the 
Community
183
 against Sweden, her country of origin, in order to ensure that the Swedish authorities 
would take into account the period of employment in Switzerland in the calculation of parental 
benefits. There was nothing in these provisions which precluded such an application.
184
 In addition, 
the ‘freedom of movement would be impeded if a national of a Contracting Party were to be placed at 
a disadvantage in his country of origin solely for having exercised his right of movement’.185 It 
appears that the ECJ is increasingly equating the Agreement’s provisions on employed and self-
employed persons with the interpretation given to corresponding Treaty provisions. The free 
movement rights of the employed and self-employed persons falling within the scope of the 
Agreement have thus become very similar to those of economically active European citizens.  
Due to the recent outcome in a Swiss referendum on immigration, demanding absolute control over 
immigration by Switzerland and the renegotiation of international agreements contravening this goal, 
all of this has become uncertain.
186
 The EU has already indicated that it is not pleased by the outcome 
and is unlikely to accept a renegotiation of the bilateral agreement on the free movement of persons on 
                                                     
176 ECJ, Grimme, C-351/08, EU:C:2009:697, para 44.  
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180 ECJ, Ettwein, C-428/11, EU:C:2012:651, para 33. 
181 ECJ, Ettwein, C-428/11, EU:C:2012:651, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paras 41-42. 
182 Ettwein (n 178) para 33.  
183 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
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184 ECJ, Bergström, C-257/10, EU:C:2011:839, paras 29-34. 
185 Ibid, para 28. 
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europes-freedom-movement-will-have-big-consequences-switzerlands-crossbow>. 
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the terms of the outcome of the referendum.
187
 The referendum, thus, has possible far-reaching 
consequences. Particularly since the ‘guillotine clause’ in the agreement stipulates that all other  
EU-Swiss bilateral agreements will cease to apply if the Agreement on free movement of persons is 
terminated.
188
 Whether the position of Swiss nationals will in the future remain as aligned to the status 
of EU citizens as is the case presently, has thus become uncertain as a consequence of the referendum. 
In contrast with the EEA and EC-Switzerland Agreements, the EC-Turkey Association looks 
relatively modest as far as free movement rights are concerned. The Member States fully control the 
admission of Turkish workers and their families to their territories.
189
 This prerogative is not unlimited 
though. The so-called ‘standstill clause’ in Article 41(1) of the Association Agreement ‘precludes  
a Member State from adopting any new measure having the object or effect of making the 
establishment and, as a corollary, the residence of a Turkish national in its territory subject to stricter 
conditions than those which applied at the time when the Additional Protocol entered into force with 
regard to the Member State concerned’.190 While the standstill clause does not alter the principle that 
the first admission is governed exclusively by Member State law,
191
 Member States are not allowed to 
introduce new substantive and/or procedural restrictions to the first admission.
192
 On the basis of this 
standstill clause, newly introduced administrative
193
 and language
194
 requirements for Turkish 
nationals have been struck down. Would the standstill be unlimited and unconditional,  
Turkish nationals would in certain areas enjoy a more beneficial rights regime than the Union citizens. 
This would be contrary to Article 59 of the Association Agreement, according to which ‘Turkey shall 
not receive more favourable treatment than that which Member States grant to one another pursuant to 
the Treaty’. Consequently, the imposition of new rules is not always prohibited. The ECJ has decided 
that ‘the adoption of measures which apply in the same way to both Turkish nationals and citizens of 
the Union is not inconsistent with the standstill rules’.195 In addition, Member States are still allowed 
to adopt more stringent measures against Turkish citizens who are not lawfully present,
196
 as long as 
those measures do not redefine the criteria for lawfulness itself.
197
 So while Member States remain 
competent to decide on first entry, the standstill clause places limitations on what Member States are 
allowed to do. 
Once admitted to a Member State, Turkish workers are given a set of rights more similar to that of EU 
citizens, , particularly related to non-discrimination at the work-place and the continuation of 
residence and access to the job-market.
198
 The ECJ has further strengthened the rights of Turkish 
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workers by interpreting the rights of Turkish workers in line with the ECJ case law on EU workers. 
The meaning given to the provisions on Turkish workers by the ECJ is such that ‘the principles laid 
down in [Articles 45 and 46 TFEU] and in [Article 57 TFEU] must be extended, so far as possible, to 
Turkish nationals’.199 
The far-reaching nature of the similarities between the EU citizen workers’ rights and the rights of the 
Turkish workers fails to hide a crucial distinction, however: the Turkish workers are only given the 
right to reside within one Member State and do not have the right to move between Member States. 
This definitely endows with a sense of irony any statements regarding the ‘free movement’ of Turkish 
citizens. Notwithstanding the fact that a clear and unquestionable lack of free movement rights has 
probably been remedied – to some extent at least – by the adoption of Directive 2003/109/EC on third-
country nationals who are long term residents,
200
 it is indispensable to be absolutely clear about the 
fact that the Turkish workers do not enjoy this quasi-citizenship right directly based on the Agreement. 
It is all the more necessary to make this absolutely clear, given the crucial importance the right enjoys 
in the context of contemporary EU citizenship law.
201
  
All the above does not alter the obvious fact that while the position of Turkish workers still 
substantially differs from Union citizens, the status of the former has become more similar to the latter 
compared with other third country nationals out there. This cannot be said for the freedom to provide 
services. Even though the ECJ believes that ‘the provisions of the Treaty relating to the freedom to 
provide services, must be extended, so far as possible, to Turkish nationals to eliminate restrictions on 
the freedom to provide services between the contracting parties’,202 a clear distinction was made 
between Turkish service providers and Union citizens in Demirkan. According to established case law, 
the freedom to provide services also includes the ‘passive’ freedom to do so, that is, ‘the freedom for 
recipients of services to go to another Member State in order to receive a service there’.203  
Ms Demirkan relied on these decisions to substantiate the claim that she, as service recipient, would 
not need a visa to visit her step-father in Germany. This argument was not accepted. The ECJ, first of 
all, recalled that no substantive measures were adopted under the Association Agreement to liberalise 
services.
204
 More importantly, the ECJ found that the aims of the Association Agreement and the 
Treaty with regard to the freedom to provide services are different. While the Association Agreement 
has a purely economic aim, it does not establish ‘any general principle of freedom of movement of 
persons between Turkey and the European Union’,205 analogous to the provisions on Union 
citizenship. There is, thus, no basis to conclude that the Agreement’s provisions on the freedom to 
provide services also include the freedom to provide passive services. 
A similar distinction between Turkish nationals and Union citizens was made in Ziebell.  
In connection with the criminal offences committed, an expulsion order was issued against Mr Ziebell, 
a Turkish national. He appealed on the grounds that according to established case law the protection 
offered to Union workers against expulsion is extended to Turkish nationals
206
 and that, therefore, he 
should be allowed to benefit from the extended protection given to Union citizens under the 
Citizenship Directive.
207
 Contrary to what some expected,
208
 the ECJ disagreed. While the Court 
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maintained that ‘the Treaty articles relating to freedom of movement for workers must be extended, as 
far as possible, to Turkish nationals who enjoy rights under the EEC-Turkey Association’,209 the 
merely economic aim of the Association Agreement have to be contrasted with the concept of Union 
citizenship, which ‘justifies the recognition, for Union citizens alone, of guarantees which are 
considerably strengthened in respect of expulsion’.210 While the ECJ has strengthened the rights of 
Turkish nationals falling within the scope of the Association Agreement, it has also explicitly 
maintained the distinction between Turkish nationals and EU citizens. In addition, in the absence of an 
automatic right to access, the position of Turkish nationals falls short of the one of EEA and Swiss 
nationals. Yet, Turks in the EU enjoy more rights than other non-EEA third-country nationals.
211
 
To Render the Invisible Visible (as a Conclusion) 
This contribution has identified a number of categories of third-country nationals directly enjoying 
quasi-citizenship rights in the European Union. The specific rights as well as the extent to which non-
EU citizens enjoy them vary, just as the nature and sources of such rights do. Some rights – for 
instance the ones enjoyed by ‘any person’ – stem directly from EU primary law, while the majority of 
such rights are actually established by secondary law of the Union (free movement rights of Blue Card 
holders and long-term resident third country nationals), international agreements (the rights of 
Turkish, Swiss, EEA etc. nationals) and national law (the political rights of the Commonwealth 
citizens in the UK).  
The different nature and the extent of the enjoyment of the rights in question notwithstanding, one 
fundamental feature of all these rights is of key importance for the analysis of the legal position of the 
absolute majority of third country nationals in the EU. This feature is most worrisome in the context of 
the development of EU integration: officially, the EU legal reality barely exists for the third country 
nationals, numerous EU law instruments tailored to regulate the legal position of this category of 
persons notwithstanding. To put it in other words, the main element of all the European approaches to 
third country nationals and their direct quasi-citizenship rights consists (bar the EEA and Swiss 
nationals) in pretending that the European Union is simply not there.  
Why is it problematic to pretend that there is no Union? This is not an issue of the amount of rights or 
ethics of non-discrimination. What is at stake is a consequential approach to the EU’s own 
achievements and the new legal-political reality being brought to life in Europe. The Balibarean 
Apartheid européen thus works in a much more sophisticated – and, consequently, problematic – way 
than simply denying citizenship rights to non-citizens. While the latter is any citizenship’s core 
function: this is a legal status delimiting the boundary of exclusion; the former has to do with the core 
underlying factors of law in Europe, which are at play. By re-emphasising the importance of the 
elusive national borders for the most vulnerable group of the population – the migrants and residents 
without EU citizenship – the European legal context is denying them the very rationale of legal-
political thinking underpinning the internal market and the ‘ever closer Union’. This amounts to  
a constant denial of all what European integration stands for to a large group of Europeans – albeit not 
enjoy the correct legal status. 
While obviously making the lives of third-country nationals more difficult than it would otherwise be, 
ignoring the achievements of the Union amounts to the denial of the objectives of integration  
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for a specific group of people and, simultaneously, sends a profoundly misleading message that there 
is no Internal Market, no Area of Freedom Security and Justice and that the invisible borders between 
the ever-integrating Member States stand strong for a reason. While it is clear that the message is 
misleading, the illusion it creates is particularly harmful, as it serves no purpose, goes against what 
numerous Europeans cherish and thus dehumanises third country nationals in a particularly 
problematic way: by denying them any possibility to appeal to rationality and common sense, by 
excluding the very reality they live in every day from the picture, which migration law is framing. 
There are thus at least three significant interrelated problems with the way how third country nationals 
are treated in the EU at the moment: 
 EU migration regulation assumes the denial of the legal political reality of the Union; 1.
 EU migration regulation bars rationality from being taken into account when third country 2.
nationals’ rights are at stake; 
 EU migration regulation sends a problematic signal that the goals and principles of the Union 3.
can be consistently ignored. 
Such treatment of the legal-political reality of the European integration project is most unhelpful and 
has to be changed. The change can come both at the national level (as the example of the 
Commonwealth citizens in the UK as well as Spain v UK demonstrate) and the EU level, as the timid 
steps of the limited free movement rights in the problematic secondary legislation demonstrate. Also 
international agreements can be of assistance here. 
While all the three ways are open (theoretically at least), the most optimal among the three should 
correspond to the leadership role of the EU’s institutions and take the shape of the secondary 
legislation. The Union itself should ensure that its very presence in the world, coupled with its 
underlying goals and values is not discarded as non-existent (even if only for a group of individuals). 
A normative position in favour of taking the reality of European integration into account should be 
adopted: a necessary positive step in the current situation of regulatory chaos and mind-blowing 
sophistication boasting wrong normative foundations. The denial of reality itself is a secure way to 
denying justice,
212
 exposing the flawed nature of the EU’s migration regime. To pretend that the EU  
is not there while framing EU law is wrong. 
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